Below, I am providing a complete copy of an editorial statement that appeared in The Wall Street Journal on September 2, 2026. The picture above comes from the online version of that editorial. I have some comments at the end.
The Supreme Court’s Ballroom Standing
A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court late Monday cleared the way for President Trump to finish his rebuild of the White House East Wing, complete with his beloved ballroom. The much bigger victory here is for the rule of law on the crucial but esoteric matter of legal “standing” (National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation).
The majority ruled that the plaintiff lacked the standing to sue because the injury claimed wasn’t “concrete and particularized.” This is the Court’s classic requirement for the judiciary to hear cases, lest courts be asked to decide all manner of differences of opinion.
Alison Hoagland, a Washington, D.C., resident and member of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, sued to stop the construction claiming it injured her “aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests” because she is offended by the scale, height and design of the planned reconstruction. She certainly has a point on Mr. Trump’s taste, which runs to the gilded, garish and gargantuan.
But is this a particular injury? Ms. Hoagland says she’s likely to walk past the White House every so often and is distressed. We can think of many things in Washington that are distressing, but we can’t sue to stop them.
“This Court has not found standing in circumstances like these before,” says the majority in an unsigned opinion. “To the contrary, we have repeatedly held that mere offense, disagreement, or distaste does not qualify as a concrete and particularized injury under Article III” of the Constitution. Something more is required than “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”
In a dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by the three liberals, writes that the ballroom “construction is likely unlawful” since Congress hasn’t appropriated the money for it. Private donors are paying for much of it. And he cites a 1992 Court precedent on standing in an environmental case (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife) that a desire to “observe an animal species” qualified as standing.
The Chief is stretching here, and the majority replies that Lujan required more than a “cognizable interest” for standing. The Chief’s opinion is a surprise, since he’s long been a legal hawk on standing. But the rest of his opinion reads as if his decision might also have something to do with his distaste for the President’s lack of taste and bulldozer politics.
The larger winner here is the future of the law. If the Court had granted Ms. Hoagland standing, judges across the country would have cited the case as cause to let countless plaintiffs sue on aesthetic differences or claims of emotional or other offense. The courts aren’t a venue for architecture criticism.
Before a person can sue, and have a court resolve a claim of damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff has "standing." A person can only sue when the person suing can show that she or he is directly and adversely affected by "a concrete and particularized injury." That you have to have "standing" in order to sue is something that is taught in the first year of law school.
In this case, a majority of the Supreme Court found that Alison Hoagland, a Washington, D.C., resident and member of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, didn't demonstrate such any such injury, and thus didn't have "standing" to bring the lawsuit challenging our current president's destruction of the East Wing of the White House, without obtaining any approval from Congress. The Wall Street Journal applauded this finding, believing that to allow the lawsuit would open the courthouse doors to anyone who might have "aesthetic differences" with a federal action, or who might claim that a federal action would constitute some sort of "emotional offense." In other words, an "aesthetic disagreement" with a governmental action is not the kind of "concrete and particularized injury" that confers "standing" on a plaintiff.
The Journal did note that the Chief Justice's dissent was based on his belief that the ballroom construction was "likely unlawful."
Well, what about that possibility? Was what our current president did, in fact, "unlawful?" What did the rest of the Supreme Court think about that question? If a governmental agency is proposing, or is actually taking, some action that we believe is "unlawful," don't we all, as citizens, have the right to go to court to stop the government from doing something that is "unlawful"?
My contention is, "yes." We do! In fact, I think I learned that in my first year in law school.
Alison Hoagland's lawsuit wasn't based on the idea that she didn't "like" the new ballroom that our current president is in the process of building. Her objection was that what our current president was doing was unauthorized by law (besides being ugly and inappropriate).
The question, in other words, wasn't "aesthetics," it was whether or not a president can treat the nation's property as if the president owns it personally, and has the absolute right to tear it right down if it offends the president's "aesthetic" sensibilities.
What our current president did was "unlawful." The Chief Justice was right about that! Every citizen of the United States should have - and does have - the right to challenge unlawful activities by governmental authorities. And if our current president is an outlaw, the president shouldn't be able to get away with an "unlawful" action by saying that citizens don't have the right to sue.
Image Credit:
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/supreme-court-donald-trump-ballroom-alison-hoagland-standing-29f937fe




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